Australia will never enjoy a truly close relationship with China because the two nations are simply too far apart in their worldviews and national security priorities, the country's former top diplomat to Beijing has warned. In a frank assessment, Graham Fletcher — who served as Australia's ambassador to China from 2019 to 2023 — says Canberra should be realistic about what the relationship can achieve, rather than chasing a deeper partnership that is effectively out of reach.
A 'modest new normal' — but with serious limits
Fletcher, who also led the negotiating team that helped finalise a free-trade agreement between the two countries in 2014, says the bilateral relationship has settled into what he describes as a "modest new normal" following years of severe turbulence. The 2022 federal election acted as a circuit-breaker, with the Albanese government moving deliberately to stabilise ties that had deteriorated sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic under then-prime minister Scott Morrison.
At their lowest point, China imposed $20 billion in trade sanctions on Australian exports — measures that have since been slowly unwound. China remains Australia's largest trading partner, absorbing roughly a third of the nation's total exports.
Despite the improvement in tone, Fletcher notes the relationship has continued to be troubled by intimidatory military encounters involving Chinese forces, and that a fundamental mismatch in values and strategic outlooks remains unresolved.
"This relationship is unlikely ever to become genuinely close — like the relaxed, intimate fellowship Australia enjoys with like-minded partners elsewhere in its region and beyond," Fletcher wrote in his analysis for the Lowy Institute. "The gulf in terms of diverging world views and national security agendas is simply too wide. It would be pointless for Canberra to pursue such a goal; it recognises this and is realistic."
Flashpoints that could shatter the current equilibrium
Fletcher identifies several wildcards that could rupture even the current, carefully managed relationship. Chief among them is the possibility of Chinese military action against Taiwan, which Beijing regards as part of its territory despite it operating as a self-governing democracy. Any conflict involving Taiwan, Fletcher warns, would constitute a "cataclysm" for the broader relationship.
Tensions over the South Pacific have already flared in recent months. China attracted widespread international condemnation in July after firing a ballistic missile into the South Pacific — a move that followed the signing of a landmark mutual defence alliance between Australia and Fiji. China's ballistic missile launch into the South Pacific underscored just how quickly regional dynamics can escalate.
While Fletcher does not consider an outright conflict likely at present, he is clear that the structural vulnerabilities in the Australia-China relationship mean disruption is always a genuine possibility. "An upheaval or conflict is always a possibility, though not in my opinion a strong one at present," he said.
Beijing's ambitions versus Canberra's calculus
Fletcher suggests the two sides are operating with quite different objectives. China, he notes, has not abandoned hope of drawing Australia more firmly into its orbit. Australia, by contrast, is focused on consolidating and managing the relationship as it currently stands — without illusions about how close it can realistically become.
For a broader picture of how these pressures have built over time, see our coverage of escalating Australia-China tensions.
Bipartisanship seen as a key safeguard
Fletcher also argues that Australia's negotiating position with China is strongest when domestic politics are kept out of the equation. Cross-party agreement on China policy, he says, produces consistency and limits Beijing's ability to exploit divisions within Australia's political system.
"Bipartisanship produces policy consistency and limits China's ability to play games within the Australian system," he said, cautioning politicians against seeking to exploit difficulties in the relationship for domestic electoral advantage.
His assessment points to a relationship that, while more stable than it has been in years, rests on a fragile foundation — one shaped less by genuine affinity than by careful, transactional management of competing national interests.
